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	 	 AbstrACt
     Civil society participation in Poverty Reduction
     Processes:
     Who is getting a seat at the pro-poor table?
The paper starts from the observation that the PRSP logic 
uses input output logic, meaning that it supposes that the input of 
‘civil society participation’ into the policy cycle will inevitably lead to 
the output of poverty reduction.  We argue that ‘civil society participa-
tion’ is a very vague concept and can constitute very different things 
depending on who is actually participating, who they represent, what 
influence they can yield...  Consequently the type of input will also de-
termine the extent to which the expected output will in fact be deliv-
ered and thus how civil society participation will ultimately contribute 
to poverty reduction. We test empirically what factors explain CSO 
participation in PRSP participatory processes based on data gathered 
from Honduran civil society organizations. 
	 	 résumé
     La participation de la société civile dans le processus  
      de  la réduction de la pauvreté:
     Qui aura un siège à la table pro-pauvre ?
Le point de départ de cet article est l'observation que la 
logique de la Stratégie pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté  (DRSP) utilise 
un modèle  input output, ce qui  signifie  qu'on suppose  que l'intro-
duction de la ‘participation de la société civile’ dans  le cycle politique 
mènera inévitablement à une réduction de la  pauvreté. Nous argu-
mentons  que la ‘participation  de la  société civile’ est un concept très 
vague. Le  concept  'société civile' peut aboutir à des  choses très diffé-
rentes, dépendant de  ceux qui  y participent  vraiment,  de ceux qu'ils 
représentent et de leur influence  sur le plan politique. La configura-
tion exacte de la  société civile déterminera donc  dans  quelle mesure  
sa participation pourra  effectivement  contribuer à une réduction de 
la  pauvreté. Nous avons vérifié empiriquement  quels types d'organi-
sations ont participé  au processus des DRSP, en nous  basant  sur  des  
données  provenant d'organisations de la  société civile  au Honduras.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 •  Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
	 	 IntroduCtIon
This paper focuses on explaining the political participa-
tion of civil society organisations in Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) 
processes. We consider the case of civil society organisations’ (CSOs) 
participation in PRS fora in Honduras.  Using survey data gathered 
from 100 CSOs from January to April 2006, the following questions 
are tackled: what factors explain participation in PRSPs, what types of 
organisations are participating, and whether they can, in fact, contrib-
ute to the ultimate goal of poverty reduction.
The paper explores the underlying assumptions of PRS 
logic,  zooming  in  on  how  exactly  civil  society  participation  should 
contribute to poverty reduction. We find that the PRS uses an input/
output logic- ‘civil society participation’ is used as the input and en-
hanced ‘country ownership’, increased ‘downward accountability’ of 
government, and improved ‘pro-poor effectiveness of the strategy’ are 
the intermediary outputs. These three intermediary outputs should 
eventually lead to poverty reduction (Molenaers & Renard, 2006). We 
argue that the term ‘civil society participation’ is very vague and can 
represent strikingly different conditions depending on who is actually 
participating, who they represent, what influence they can exert, etc.  
The type of input will also determine the extent to which the various 
expected outcomes can potentially be attained, and thus how civil so-
ciety participation will ultimately advance poverty reduction. Concen-
trating solely on the input side of the equation, i.e. “CSO participation”, 
we will first turn to the academic debate surrounding this concept.  
What types of organisations tend to participate politically?  What fac-
tors determine the decisions of CSOs not to participate?  Remarkably 
though, whereas vast research has been done on what determines the 
political participation of individuals, theorizing on what influences col-
lective actors to participate is far less extensive (Lavalle et al., 2005)1. 
Therefore, to find out what factors explain CSO participation in PRSP’s, 
we start from the model of individual political participation as set 
out by Brady, Verba and Schlozman in their 1995 article2, and subse-
quently adapt the model for collective actors and for the different in-
stitutional settings of a highly aid-dependent developing country. The 
adapted model tests the availability of organisation resources (e.g. 
human and financial), the organisation’s institutional embeddedness 
(e.g. networks with state actors, donors, and other CSOs), as well as 
motivational factors as determinants of participation.  
The paper is organised as follows: the first part presents 
the PRS logic on civil society participation. As present PRS logic is 
based largely on vague conceptualizations (yet instigates high expec-
tations of reducing poverty), we wish to confront this logic with the 
academic research on participation. The second part of this paper re-
views the civic voluntarism model, an academic model explaining the 
1  Notwithstanding an extensive body of research 
and literature on participation and the activities 
of interest groups in the United States of America 
(Andrews & Edwards, 2004; Caldeira & Wright, 
1990;  Golden,  1998;  Hojnacki  &  Kimball,  1999; 
Nownes & Freeman, 1998; Schattschneider, 1960; 
Schlozman,  1984;  Schlozman  &  Tierney,  1983), 
models of factors explaining the political participa-
tion of interest groups, to the best of our knowl-
edge, do not hold a centre-stage position therein.  
  
2  Brady, H., Verba, S. and Schlozman, K. (1995). 
Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Partici-
pation, APSR, Vol.89, No.2, pp. 271- 294. • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
political participation of individuals.  In the third section, this model 
will be adapted from its original context (i.e. the participation of an 
individual citizen in a predominantly Western context) to the setting 
of a CSO in an aid-dependent country. The adapted model will then 
be tested with data from surveys of 100 Honduran CSOs.  The final 
section of the paper compares these findings with previous research, 
and distils the relevant consequences for the desired output of poverty 
reduction. IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 • 7 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
	 1.	 Prs	logIC	on	CIvIl	soCIety	PArtICIPAtIon:			
	 	 	 vAguely	defIned	yet	hIghly	AmbItIous
This section sets out to explore the underlying logic of the 
conditionality of civil society participation in the elaboration, imple-
mentation and evaluation of PRSP’s as imposed by international finan-
cial institutions.3  Why is civil society participation believed to be so 
important for poverty reduction? Molenaers and Renard schematically 
summarize the underlying logic found implicitly and explicitly in PRSP 
documents (Molenaers & Renard, 2006).  Civil society participation is 
believed to contribute to poverty reduction by triggering three inter-









A primary line of reasoning links civil society participation 
through broad-based ownership of the strategy to poverty reduction.  
One of the major flaws of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP’s), the 
PRSP’s predecessor, was said to be that recipient governments only 
paid lip service to policy conditionalities imposed by international fi-
nancial institutions to secure financial assistance. When granted fi-
nancial assistance, the prescribed adjustment policies were often not 
implemented, as they had been externally imposed with neither the 
recipient government nor the society at large assuming ownership of 
the proposed policy changes (IMF, 2004). Accordingly, international 
financial institutions have now deemed ownership to be a crucial fac-
tor for the effective implementation of any PRS policy (World Bank, 
1998).  
The Poverty Reduction Strategy was thus to be elabo-
rated by the recipient government itself.  Civil society participation 
should, in this line of reasoning, expand the scope of ownership be-
yond the government alone into a broad-based country ownership, 
which should, in principle, increase the odds of its effective elabora-
tion and implementation.  The second intermediary output catalysed 
by civil society participation is pro-poor effectiveness. CSOs, either 
by organising poor people themselves, or by working with poor peo-
ple, accumulate hands-on knowledge about poverty, its causes and 
remedies, as well as valuable information about the realities on the 
ground.  When feeding this knowledge and expertise into the elabora-
3  Although  civil  society  participation  is  indeed 
central in the PRSP discourse, there is no critical, 
consistent scrutiny of compliance with this condi-
tionality (Dewachter, 2005). • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
tion of the strategy, as well as using the CSOs’ presence in the field to 
check on progress made, and so serving as a valuable feedback-loop 
for the policy cycle, civil society participation should raise the pro-poor 
effectiveness of the strategy thus contributing towards genuine pov-
erty reduction.  Finally, CSOs taking on the role of watchdogs can in-
sist on a more accountable attitude from the executing government 
towards society-at-large, thereby seeing to it that scarce resources 
are deployed as efficiently as possible. This is, in a nutshell, the logic 
behind civil society participation in the elaboration, implementation 
and evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (Molenaers & Re-
nard, 2006).  As is clear from the above, ‘civil society participation’ 
carries with it very high expectations. Conversely, how to actually 
realize these goals is not clearly stipulated. The PRSP model uses an 
input-output logic in which various key concepts are vaguely defined. 
What exactly, for example, constitutes ‘civil society participation in 
PRSPs?’ The PRSP source book‘s chapter on participation states that 
“in the design4 of national PRS governments generally engage with organ-
ized civil society groups in the capital or main urban areas. However, na-
tional-level civic engagement also allows governments to reach a wider 
range of stakeholders and initiate dialogue with civil society organizations 
such as farmers’ associations, cooperatives, unions, chambers of commerce, 
women’s groups and groups that represent the poor and vulnerable through 
umbrella organizations or networks of ngo’s”. (Tikare et al., 2002, p.245). 
Higher-level organizations are recommended to function as interme-
diaries between national government and local level stakeholders as 
well as stimulating information exchange and building a consensus on 
poverty reduction efforts (Tikare et al., 2002).  Apart from some ‘good 
practices’, little more is specified about who should participate, how 
they should be approached or recruited, or whom they should repre-
sent. And many more questions remain unanswered. Which organi-
sations can contribute to these specific goals? Can one organisation 
realise all three intermediary goals? And if not, can one organisation’s 
efforts negate another’s? Do unions and chambers of commerce have 
common pro-poor perspectives? What exactly is meant by pro-poor 
perspectives or broad-based ownership?  Furthermore, the relation-
ships between the basic inputs, intermediary outputs and eventual 
outcomes are not unambiguous.  Does genuine civil society ownership 
of and accountability over the PRS strategy inevitably lead to poverty 
reduction? Many PRS concepts and relationships need clarification. In 
this paper however, we will only focus on the input side, i.e. ‘ civil soci-
ety participation’. 
The combination of vague concepts and ambiguous rela-
tionships with high expectations compels us to critically scrutinize this 
concept of ‘civil society participation’. We shall, therefore, confront 
this concept of participation, as proposed by PRS logic with academic 
theory and empirical findings. 
4  This  quote  reviews  stakeholder  involvement 
in the design of the PRS.  Nevertheless, the same 
chapter also briefly touches upon stakeholder in-
volvement in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
of the strategy. The handbook prescribes that a 
stakeholder analysis is to determine who can be 
involved in the M&E of the strategy.  Further in-
formation on who should be participating in order 
to obtain the desired output is not provided.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 •  Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
	 2	 ComPArIng	the	Prs	logIC	wIth	the	ACAdemIC		
	 	 	 stAnCe	on	PArtICIPAtIon
When reviewing the academic literature on political par-
ticipation, various stark contrasts are immediately apparent between 
the use of ‘participation’ in the PRS discourse and in mainstream aca-








Unit of Analysis Organisations Individual (and organisations)





A first difference concerns the unit of analysis. Whereas 
the PRS discourse focuses almost exclusively on CSOs as the partici-
pating entity, the academic literature on political participation gener-
ally centres on individual participation.  Moreover, a whole academic 
debate  relates  to  the  question  of  ‘who  participates’,  bringing  the 
problem of unequal access to the fore.  Research on individual political 
participation, as well as interest groups, finds political participation to 
be skewed towards certain groups. Verba, Schlozman and Brady note 
that, “Voices heard through the medium of citizen participation will 
be often loud, sometimes clear but rarely equal” (Schlozman, Brady & 
Verba, 1997, p.6). 
Similarly Schattschneider counters the pluralist view of 
egalitarian access to the US pressure group system by stating that, 
“the flaw in pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with an 
upper class accent” (Schattschneider, 1960, p.35). 
Empirical research by Schlozman and Tierney on US inter-
est groups led them to conclude that, “ the evidence indicates clearly 
that the pressure system is tilted heavily in favor of the well-off, es-
pecially business, at the expense of the representation of broad pub-
lic interests and the interests of those with few political resources” 
(Schlozman, 1984, p.1028-1029). These findings point towards a po-
tential and pivotal black hole in the PRS discourse.  The virtually non-
existent conditions of equal access and influence of different actors in 
the political participation process render the high expectations placed 
upon civil society participation in PRSP precarious.5 Will poor people’s 
organisations or organisations defending a pro-poor stance, in fact, be 
  5 The  thesis  that  civil  society  participation  in-
evitably leads to poverty reduction becomes par-
ticularly problematic in countries plagued by high 
income-inequality; as many developing countries 
are.  Honduras has a Gini coefficient of 53.8 (CIA 
Gini index 2003). However, the United States of 
America, where most of the empirical research on 
interest groups has taken place is, in itself, hardly 
a role model for income-equality (Gini coefficient : 
45, CIA Gini index 2004).10 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
able to secure a seat at the pro-poor table? And if so, will they have 
enough political leverage to compel vested interests to embark on a 
pro-poor heading? The PRS approach on participation, in which par-
ticipation is presented as an unproblematic, technocratic process in 
which all voices can be heard and pro-poor interests will automatically 
prevail, has a blind spot for the politics of participation. As Booth puts 
it, “the biggest challenge will be to stop relying on the essentially techno-
cratic instrument of the PRS to solve essentially political problems” (Booth 
et al., 2006, p8).
This paper, therefore, starts from a model of individual 
political participation. In a later stage, this classical model will be 
adapted to an organisational and aid-dependent country setting to 
develop a model for political participation of organizations in the PRSP 
context.  Empirically, we will test what the most important hurdles to 
CSO participation in the PRS are, and evaluate whether they represent 
serious constraints on, or constitute a refutation of PRS logic.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 • 11 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
	 3	 PolItICAl	PArtICIPAtIon	of	IndIvIduAls:
	 	 the		CIvIC	voluntArIsm	model
   3.1  Political Participation
Barnes and Kaase use a broad and standard definition of 
political participation which refers to political participation as, “all vol-
untary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or 
indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system” (Barnes 
& Kaase, 1979, p.59).6  Various forms of political participation include: 
voting; letter-writing to political representatives; working for/donating 
to a campaign; attending a political meeting; etc. One can differenti-
ate between active (e.g. voting) or passive (e.g. attending a ceremony); 
conventional (e.g. campaign donations) or unconventional (e.g. occu-
pying public buildings); and symbolic (e.g. singing the national anthem 
at a public rally) or instrumental (e.g. lobbying) political participation 
(Conway, 1985). 
   3.2  The Civic Voluntarism Model
Brady, Verba and Schlozman, in their classic 1995 article, 
present a model of individual political participation, also referred to as 
the civic voluntarism model. The authors start by posing the question, 
“why do people not participate in politics?”  A threefold answer helps, 
in their opinion, to explain a lack of popular political participation: be-
cause “they can’t”; because “they do not want to”; and/or because 
“they were not asked”.  
The first part of the puzzle (i.e. “they can’t”) focuses on 
the  resources  needed  to  participate  politically.  This  component  is 
elaborated in depth in Brady, Verba and Schlozman’s resource model 
of political participation.7 The second dimension in explaining partici-
pation (i.e. “they do not want to”) is the will to participate, which is 
often labelled as political engagement and operationalised by: atti-
tudes such as ‘political participation can make a difference’, an inter-
est in politics or a commitment to a specific issue or cause, etc. The 
third (i.e. “they were not asked”) relates to the recruitment of indi-
viduals. Recruitment has been found to importantly increase the pro-
pensity of individuals to participate; depending on the recruitment 
networks they belong to.  Having the necessary resources and will to 
engage in political activity does not always guarantee that individuals 
will, in fact, participate. Being asked or invited to join/act can increase 
the likelihood that an individual will indeed participate (Brady, Verba 
& Schlozman, 1995).  Now we will consider each of these dimensions 
separately.
 
  6 The  definition  used  by  Barnes  and  Kaase  is 
broader than the definition used by other partici-
pation scholars. They wish to incorporate and em-
phasize the importance of ‘non-classical’ forms of 
participation,  like  protesting.    A  classical  defini-
tion of political participation provided by Verba & 
Nie reads, “Political participation refers to those 
activities by private citizens that aim to influence 
the government either by affecting the choice of 
government personnel or their choices.” (Verba & 
Nie, 1972, p.2).
7  In  the  1995  article,  these  three  dimensions 
were put forward within a model explaining par-
ticipation. However, only the resource dimension 
was included in the empirically tested model. In 
later publications, the two other dimensions were 
incorporated in empirically tested models (Brady, 
Schlozman & Verba, 1999)12 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
  3.2.1  Resources: “because they can’t”
The civic voluntarism model8 distinguishes three differ-
ent resources for political participation: time; income and civic skills.  
Whereas  time  and  income  are  relatively  straightforward  concepts, 
civic skills might require a bit of elaboration. Civic skills are a variety 
of practical capacities accumulated in different ways throughout life. 
Civic skills can be organizational skills such as chairing a meeting or 
communication skills like writing letters or giving a presentation. One 
can acquire civic skills through formal education and/or through skill-
building activities in various types of organizations, in church or in 
one’s professional life. These capacities were found to be an important 
factor in explaining political participation, next to the income and the 
time available to the individual (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995). The 
relative importance of these resources (i.e. time-money-civic skills) in 
explaining participation depends on the type of participation.  It was 
found that both free time and civic skills were strongly related to voting. 
Participant income levels were a significant influence on the amount of 
campaign contributions made (not so surprising considering that one 
needs “to have money in order to contribute money”).
  
  3.2.2  Engagement:“ because they don’t want to”
The second part of the answer as to why people would not 
participate is because, ‘they don’t want to’.  This seems almost too ob-
vious, nevertheless the demand-side of participation has not always 
been considered when searching for factors influencing an individu-
al’s propensity to participate.  Whereas focusing on the supply-side of 
the equation tends to centre on whether the necessary resources are 
available to overcome the costs of participation (e.g. time and money), 
or ways to reduce these costs (e.g. networks or different types of par-
ticipation), the demand side looks at whether individuals will be more 
inclined  to  participate  when  the  benefits  of  participation  (e.g.  per-
sonal satisfaction) are greater. The demand-side has been conceived 
in various ways: factors that amplify the rewards of participation, for 
example: the perception of political efficacy ; ideological profiles ; and 
political knowledge (Reef & Knoke, 1999).Several studies have found 
that individuals are more likely to participate if they feel that their par-
ticipation would make a difference (Almond & Verba, 1963; Campbell 
et al., 1960; Conway, 2000; Matthews & Protho, 1966), and/or if they 
care and are knowledgeable about politics (Conway, 2000; Matthews 
& Protho, 1966). Additionally, individuals with a specific partisan pref-
erence tend to participate more than individuals without one, other 
things being equal (Conway, 2000; Campbell et al., 1954; Campbell 
et al., 1960; Dalton, 2002; Mathews & Protho, 1966; Schussman & 
Soule, 2005). 
8  Before  the  civic  voluntarism  model,  the  SES 
model was the most used model explaining po-
litical  participation.    The  SES  model  explained 
political participation on the basis of an individu-
al’s  income,  occupation,  and,  most  importantly, 
education level.  Although the SES model offers 
considerable empirical power in predicting politi-
cal participation, the model was criticized as being 
apolitical,  non-theoretical  and  overly  simplistic 
(Schlozman, 2002; Leighley, 1995). In spite of the 
critiques of the SES model, socio-economic vari-
ables are included in all models explaining politi-
cal participation, and continue to be amongst the 
most important predictors of participation. 
 IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 • 1 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
  3.2.3  Recruitment: “because they weren’t asked”
The final component of the civic voluntarism model is re-
cruitment. This component proposes that when individuals are asked 
to participate, or have intensive contacts with individuals whom are 
connected to the political participation process, they are more likely 
to participate because of these recruitment networks.  Research on 
the mobilisation of voters in elections has shown that political parties 
have a very important recruiting effect on individual participation (Ro-
senstone & Hansen, 1993). Not only do political parties exert a mobi-
lising influence, research has found that relatives, friends, neighbours 
and colleagues, amongst others, also recruit persons for participa-
tion. Importantly, though not surprisingly, the people approached by 
recruiters tend to have the profiles of individuals with already a high 
potential of participating (Brady et al., 1999).
  3.2.4  Control Variables
Brady, Verba and Schlozman, like most political partici-
pation researchers, include a number of control variables in their civic 
voluntarism  model  to  capture  some  of  the  individual’s  characteris-
tics that do not fall within the three dimensions described above, yet 
which do influence political participation. Those most often included 
are sex and age (Brady, et al., 1995; Martinez, 2005). Research has 
found women to participate less politically than their male counter-
parts, and has observed that the middle-aged are more politically ac-
tive than young adults or elderly. Even so, these findings are not con-
sistent in all forms of political participation: women for instance do not 
vote significantly less than men, nor do young people contribute less 
to campaigns than their elders (Schlozman, 2002). 14 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
	 4	 trAnsPlAntIng	the	model:	from	An	IndIvIdu	
	 	 	 Al’s	PArtICIPAtIon	In	A	western	Country	to		
	 	 	 An	orgAnIsAtIon’s	PArtICIPAtIon	In	An	AId-		
	 	 	 dePendent	settIng
   4.1  Political Participation of Collective Actors
In current development rhetoric, an active role is foreseen 
for ‘civil society’. Although many diverging definitions exist,9 civil soci-
ety is generally seen as comprising organisations, albeit with varying 
degrees of institutionalisation.10 The emphasis is most definitely not 
placed on the individual/citizen.  Confronting ‘civil society participa-
tion logic’ with theories of (individual) participation therefore requires 
adapting models of individual participation to the participation of col-
lective actors. The definition of political participation, as put forward 
by Barnes and Kaase, can easily be broadened to include civil society 
participation by replacing ‘individual citizens’ with ‘actors’, rendering 
the definition of political participation as follows: political participa-
tion includes all voluntary activities by actors intended to influence either 
directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system 
(adapted from Barnes & Kaase, 1979, p.59). Three fields of literature, 
namely interest group research; social movement and non-profit sec-
tor research, will be used to supplement existing research on collec-
tive actors to develop a modified model explaining political participa-
tion.11
 
   4.2  Adapting the Model
In our opinion, the same three categories (i.e. resources, 
engagement and recruitment) can usefully be included in explaining 
why CSOs do (or do not) participate politically. We will now focus sepa-
rately on each of the three dimensions, and modify each to an organi-
sational frame or context.
 
  4.2.1  Resources: “because they can’t”
Transposing the resource dimension from an individual 
to an organizational context does not prove too difficult as the logic 
behind the lack of resources potentially constraining individual par-
ticipation also applies to organisations. Therefore, the adapted model 
also hypothesizes that an organisation faced with a lack of financial 
resources, time or human capital (e.g. educational level) will be less 
likely, other things being equal, to participate politically. To opera-
tionalize these organisational resources, we now turn to the literature 
on interest groups, social movements12 and non-profit organisations. 
Organizations’ resources are used in explaining the emergence or sur-
9  For definitions of civil society, see Hadenius & 
Uggla, 1996; Foley & Edwards, 1998; and the PRS 
source book ( Tikare et al. , 2002).
10 Although the PRS source book focuses on the 
participation  of  civil  society  organisations,  the 
participation  of  individuals  is  not  completely 
overlooked.  Nevertheless, the type of individual 
participation foreseen is of a very different nature 
than in classical participation research.  There is 
no  reference  made  to  voting,  contacting  public 
officials nor protests or other forms of political 
action.  Once again, the technocratic nature of 
participation in PRS becomes clear.  Participation 
is not seen as a political right (i.e. to express one’s 
political  preferences  to  the  policy  maker),  but 
rather as a technocratic tool to get information on 
local-level realities to the policy maker.
 
11  Various  scholars  have  advised  that  the  divi-
sions between these three disciplines should not 
stand in the way of learning from the other disci-
plines. “Overall there is substantial common ground in 
conceptual definitions of public interest groups, social 
movement  organizations  and  non-profit  advocacy 
organizations. Most of the divergence comes from dif-
fering research strategies and questions. (…) Thus we 
treat as variables some phenomena that other scholars 
would use to define subsets of advocacy organisations, 
such  as  tactics,  strategy,  scope,  organizational  form 
and targets. (…) The compartmentalization of research 
within sub-fields and disciplines means that core ideas 
and findings go unnoticed by scholars studying similar 
phenomena. In addition, scholars tend to focus on a 
small  subset  of  advocacy  organizations  carrying  bi-
ases of overemphasising the distinctiveness of interest 
groups, social movement organizations and non-profits 
(Andrews & Edwards, 2004, p.500).
12 One of the most prominent theoretical schools 
in social movement research since the 1970’s is 
resource mobilization.  Basically, the theory con-
tends that movements emerge when activists are 
able to mobilize important resources and pre-ex-
isting social networks behind a cause (Guidry et 
al., 2000). Pre-existing social and organizational 
resources were found to be important in explain-
ing social movement emergence and mobilization 
( Cress & Snow, 1996). Nevertheless, Cress and 
Snow stated that, surprisingly, given the central-
ity of the concept little progress had been made 
in anchoring resources empirically or in creating 
conceptual clarity on what resources should be 
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vival of social movements (Snow et al., 2004), the different forms of 
non-profit organizations (Barr et al., 2005), and the activity of interest 
groups (Edwards & Andrews, 2004).  
To operationalise financial resources, many researchers 
have used the organization’s budget as an indicator (Lavalle et al., 
2005; Guo & Acar, 2005). Other studies use an index based on the 
material resources available to the organization (Cress & Snow, 1996). 
In our study, we have opted to use both.13
The time available to an individual, as a necessary re-
source for participation, can find its equivalent in the availability of 
professional staff within the organization.  An organization that de-
pends exclusively on voluntary personnel is less likely to have the time 
at its disposal to participate in political action than one with paid staff 
who can. 
The third element in the civic voluntarism model are the 
individuals’ civic skills (e.g. writing letters, presenting a proposal, etc.). 
These skills are generally obtained through education and/or work in 
an organization. The educational level of an individual was operation-
alized by asking the respondent what was the highest level of school-
ing he/she had reached. In our research, the educational level variable 
will measure the highest education level of the organisation’s board.14 
The education factor in participation will thus be included in the adapt-
ed model for organisational participation.  The second way of accumu-
lating civic skills is by participating in organisations (e.g. church, com-
mercial or non-political organisations, etc.) or at work. Individuals 
develop these skills by organising and participating in the processes 
of the organisation. Skills developed by participating in organisations 
or in the workplace tend to reinforce initial skill inequalities amongst 
their members/ employees, in that the highly skilled people will be 
given more responsibilities, thereby developing more extra skills, than 
the poorly skilled.  Participating in organisations or working therefore 
does not level out differences in skills, on the contrary. The exception 
may be the church, which is a fairly egalitarian community organisa-
tion. The distribution of skills amongst its members is typically inde-
pendent of their socio-economic status (Brady et al.; 1995). However, 
since the unit of analysis in our research is the organisation itself, the 
civic skills learned by its membership need not be incorporated sepa-
rately as an explanatory factor.
The relationship between resources and political partici-
pation, according to the civic voluntarism model, would be that the 
more resources an organisation has at its disposal, the more likely 
political participation will be, other things being equal. However, with 
PRSP logic there should be no relationship (or a negative relationship, 
if any) between an organisation’s resources and its political participa-
tion,15 since the whole purpose of civil society participation was to in-
corporate the interests of the poor into the policy cycle.16 
13 Nevertheless,  we  believe  that  the  quality  of 
data on the index of physical assets of an organi-
sation is better than that on its financial budget.  
This is due to a higher number of missing values 
on budget information, which is understandable 
since exact data on an organisation’s budget is 
more  complicated  than  that  on  its  physical  in-
frastructure.  Secondly, the tendency for socially 
desirable answering is less when answering the 
physical infrastructure questions, given the fact 
that the interviewer can actually verify, to a large 
extent,  the  answers  of  the  respondent.  Finally, 
and most importantly, given the theoretical pur-
pose of explaining participation (e.g. how a lack of 
resources could, in fact, constrain participation), 
the type of resources we wish to incorporate into 
the research include assets relevant to participa-
tion, like: a computer, internet, a telephone, a car, 
a  motorcycle  or  other  means  of  transportation, 
etc. Therefore, the index of physical assets reflects 
better  the  resources  relevant  for  participation 
than the organisation’s budget. Given these three 
advantages, we rely more on the index of material 
resources than the organisation’s budget. Fortu-
nately, there is a strong correlation between both 
( Spearman’s rho =0.838).
14 To compare the educational level among the 
various organisations, and given the fact that all 
organisations indicated the Board as the highest 
authority of the organisation, we opted to record 
the highest and the average level of schooling of 
the members of the Board. The hypothesis is that 
since the Board is the showpiece of the organisa-
tion, qualified persons would therefore try to be on 
the Board or even been pushed into it.  Therefore 
the highest educational level of the organisation’s 
Board can serve as a good proxy for the highest 
educational level of the whole organisation.
15 It is assumed that poor peoples’ organisations 
have equal or fewer available resources than do 
other organisations.
16 This is not to say that pro-poor interests can-
not  be  represented  by  organisations  that  have 
sufficient resources. Yet, research tends to reveal 
skewness in what interests and concerns reach 
the political fora, if indeed participation is skewed 
in terms of resources (Verba et al., 1993). The link 
between the policy preferences of an organization 
and resource availability is beyond the scope of 
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Contact with a PRS donor
Control Variables Control Variables
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Age Years Age of the 
Organisation
Number of years it exists
   4.2.2 Engagement: “because they don’t want to”
An actor’s perception of the efficacy of political participa-
tion can influence his intention to participate (Almond & Verba, 1963; 
Campbell et al., 1960; Conway, 2000; Matthews & Protho, 1966).  
Why would any actor participate if he does not believe that there is a 
potential benefit to participation?  If an actor, therefore, believes that 
a political action enhances the pursuit of a specific goal, his propensity 
to participate will be greater, other things being equal, than that of an 
actor who believes his participation will be useless. We will, therefore, 
test whether the perceived efficacy of an actor’s political participation 
- in a CSO in the adapted model - increases the likelihood of its partici-
pation.  
The previous hypothesis explains the intentions of organ-
isations to participate when incentives to do so are present. However, 
there can also be strong incentives not to participate. A situation could 
arise where an organisation might actually stand to lose by participat-
ing, rather than simply not gaining anything. This could be the case for 
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with what is perceived as the ideological profile of the organising ac-
tors of the participatory council.  In such cases, CSOs might fear losing 
credibility with their (grass roots) supporters (Gidron et al., 1999).  The 
hypothesized relationship is that the more incongruent the ideological 
profile of the organisation with the organizers’ profile,17 the less likely 
the organisation will tend to participate.
  4.2.3  Recruitment: ”because they weren’t asked”
In  the  context  of  our  research,  recruitment  networks 
could be translated into organisations’ contacts with actors related to 
the PRSP participation process. In the Honduran setting, the partici-
patory meetings, in fact, are ‘open-access’ activities, as are most other 
forms of political participation (e.g. like letter-writing to political rep-
resentatives, protests, etc.). The PRSP progress report meetings are 
‘open-access’. Everybody can attend but only some are invited to par-
ticipate, either formally or informally.  Formally, it is the responsibility 
of the twelve CSOs on the PRS council,18 each representing a certain 
sector of civil society, to invite organisations of their sector to partici-
pate in the participatory councils. Informally, other PRS-related actors 
(i.e. international donors or technical units within the Ministries) may 
recruit organisations into the PRS process by informing them about 
the process, or by strengthening their perception of the potential ef-
fectiveness of their participation. These ‘PRS’-related actors, as we 
will henceforth label them in our research, will be operationalised as 
those actors typically involved in the ‘new PRS game’. First of all, the 
members of the PRS council are contacts of formal or direct recruit-
ment. Secondly, a number of international donors19 that value the PRS 
process and especially the participation process can be seen as infor-
mal or indirect recruitment contacts. Therefore, the hypothesized re-
lationship between direct (and/or indirect) recruitment contacts20 and 
participation will be that the more recruitment contacts are made, the 
more likely it is that the organisations contacted will join and partici-
pate.
  
  4.2.4  Control variables
Empirical research on organisations often uses variables 
that can be compared to the control variables used in survey research 
on individuals (e.g. sex, age, etc.). We found that existing research gen-
erally used the type, size and age of the organisation as control vari-
ables (Barret al., 2005; Guo & Acar, 2005; Lavalle et al., 2005). 
The first control variable is the type of the organisation, 
which has been operationalised in our research as the organizational 
level. First-level organisations do not have any other organizations 
as their members, whereas higher-level organizations are essentially 
17 The ideological profile of the organisation was 
measured in several ways: The respondent was 
asked to indicate the programme/ideas of which 
political  party  the  organisation  could  subscribe 
to most. Moreover, he/ she was asked to situate 
him/herself on a left- right continuum (Robinson 
et al., 1972). Furthermore, the respondent’s active 
personal support for a political candidate during 
the last national elections (November 2005) was 
noted.  All three measures were tested for, though 
only one (partisan preferences) is mentioned in 
Table 2.
18 The  PRS  council,  or  the  ‘Consejo  Consultivo 
de la Estrategia para la Reducción de la Pobreza’, 
consists of twelve representatives from civil soci-
ety and five representatives from the government. 
Two representatives from the international donor 
community attend the meetings as observers. The 
twelve civil sectors are: children & youth; women; 
the disabled; the elderly; domestic ngo’s; social 
economy;  patronatos;  farmers;  labour  move-
ments; formal economy; small and median enter-
prises  and  municipalities.    Regional  representa-
tives often participate but do not have a formal 
vote. 
19 The  categorizing  of  international  donors  as 
‘PRS donors’ was based on the centrality of ‘PRS 
participation’ in their programme documents as 
well as distilled from interviews with various do-
nors, CSOs and government actors.
20 Recruitment contacts are measured as the out-
degree of a CSO in the network (relations between 
CSOs and donors/ prsp council). The concept of 
outdegree refers to the number of ties an actor 
(CSO) has established with another actor (in this 
case international donors / the PRS council) (Diani, 
1995). Apart from contact itself (as a dichotomous 
yes/no variable) with actors, we have also taken 
into account the frequency of the contact with 
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umbrella bodies. Lavalle found coordinating organisations to be more 
inclined to participate politically than other types of organizations 
(Lavalle et al., 2005).  The PRS source book has also pointed out the 
important role of these organisations as intermediaries between gov-
ernment and grass roots organisations. 
The second control variable is the age of the organisation, 
expressed in the number of years that the organization has existed. 
The number of years since the organisation was founded is introduced 
as a continuous variable.21  Interest group research has found a sub-
stantial increase in the number of certain types of CSOs in Western 
countries since the 1960s (e.g. public interest, civil rights and social 
welfare organisations) and hypothesized that given their specific pro-
file they might be more inclined to participate politically. These organ-
isations are, nevertheless, still relatively under-represented in terms 
of political participation.22 We wish, therefore, to check in the Hondu-
ran setting for any relationship between the date of an organisation’s 
foundation and its tendency to participate politically.   
21 Furthermore, we have checked two more alter-
native  hypotheses  regarding  the  organizational 
age. First, the organisation’s year of foundation is 
also introduced into the model as a dummy vari-
able, coding 0/1 for foundations before or after 
the transition to democracy, which we have set as 
1982 in Honduras’ case.  Organisations created in 
times of democratization are theorized to be more 
inclined  to  participate  politically  (Lavalle  et  al., 
2005). Additionally, a third variable is also tested, 
namely an ordinal variable introducing Hurricane 
Mitch as an important landmark in the history of 
CSOs in Honduras.  However, neither of the age 
variables were found to be significant
22 Schlozman found that although there has been 
an increase in the number of these type of organi-
sations since the 1960’s, there has not been an 
increased participation of these ‘ new public inter-
est groups’ in the US pressure or lobbying system, 
thereby  not  altering  the  bias  towards  business 
groups (Schlozman, 1984).IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 • 1 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
	 	5	 methodology23
The research is conducted using survey data gathered be-
tween January and September 2006 on 100 CSOs in Honduras. The 
research set up required a comparison of ‘participating organisations’ 
with ‘non-participating organisations’. A non-stratified random sam-
ple of organizations would probably have led to the selection of only a 
limited number of participating organisations, therefore a theoretical 
sampling frame was used. First, a random sample of fifty organisa-
tions was taken from a sub-population of participating organisations. 
Subsequently, a random sample of fifty organisations from the popu-
lation of non-participating organisations was drawn.
Let’s start with the construction of the population of par-
ticipating CSOs.  Listings were obtained from the last participatory 
evaluation meeting of the PRSP progress report. These meetings were 
held in six different regions (Table 3). Four of the six regions were in-
corporated into the research. A random sample of each of the regional 
participant’s lists was taken, but checking on the number of organisa-
tions from each region, so that the relative weight of each of the re-
gions is comparable to that in the original list of participants.  
	 Table	3:	 The	four	selected	regions	in	the	sample
City of consultation Number of 














Santa Rosa de Copan 127 28.9% 17 30.9%
La Ceiba 85 19% 12 21.8%
Tegucigalpa 171 38.95% 20 36.4%
Choluteca 56 12.7% 6 10.9%
Total 439 100% 55 100%
Why those four regions?  The research design set out to 
incorporate variations between the different regions. The chosen in-
dicators were: the location of the region; the poverty profile24 of the 
region; and the involvement of regional CSOs25 in the PRSP process. 
Moreover, we have checked for differences in political preferences26 in 
the regions (Table 4).
23 At the outset of this methodological section, it 
would be worth stressing that at certain points 
in  setting  up  the  empirical  research  we  were 
confronted with methodological pitfalls and con-
straints compelling us to trade-off methodologi-
cal rigour in favour of staying close to the original 
research question.  Since there is little empirical 
research on the political participation of CSOs to 
build on, one occasionally needs to balance the 
needs  of  external  validity  against  the  potential 
relevance of the research outcome.
24 Based  on  Datos  del  Censo  Nacional  de  Pob-
lación y Vivienda 2001 – INE
25  Based  on  various  interviews  with  CSO  repre-
sentatives.
26 Based on election results of congressional and 
presidential elections between 1980- 2005  (Tri-











Choluteca Poor Periphery Low Mixed
Copan Poor Periphery High Mixed
Tegucigalpa Rich Centre High Mixed
La Ceiba Rich Centre Low Mixed
Tocoa Poor Periphery High Mixed
San Pedro Sula Rich Centre Low Mixed
Given that there are no readily available, all-encompass-
ing lists of Honduran CSOs, a universe had to be constructed.  An ini-
tial review of data sources provided us with a CSO database, based on 
a civil society mapping exercise27 organised by the civil society ad hoc 
committee in September 2000-March 2001 (Espinoza, 2003). This 
mapping exercise provided a directory of CSOs based on what organi-
sations could be found in a variety of documents. In order to construct 
that universe of active CSOs in Honduras, information from various 
sources was compiled into one listing. Among the sources used were: 
listings from the Ministry of Governance and Justice of registries of 
organizations which had obtained the ‘personeria juridica’ from 1990 
through 2001; listings from bi- and multilateral donors of organiza-
tions they had worked with or had been in contact with; and listings 
from umbrella organisations of their members.  
For constructing our population of non-participating or-
ganizations, we started from this mapping exercise. These organisa-
tions were segregated according to regions with only organisations 
from the four selected regions ( i.e. Choluteca, Copan, La Ceiba and 
Tegucigalpa) retained.  However, using only this mapping exercise as a 
basis for our population would create population biases.28 For exam-
ple, although interest group research very often uses state registries 
of tax exemptions (Schlozman & Tierney 1986; Knoke, 1990) and/or 
other types of government registrations (Barr et al., 2005) as popula-
tion listings, this can be problematic.  Some scholars have pointed out 
that there are, in fact, a number of biases related to this manner of 
constructing a population. In their research, they compared the popu-
lation obtained through the government listings method with that 
obtained through the triangulation method and found important dif-
ferences between the two, namely a large organisation bias possibly 
combined with an ideological bias (Caldeira & Wright, 1990). Other 
scholars (i.e. Andrews & Edwards, 2004) concur with these findings 
in arguing for a triangulation of sources (e.g. press, government, other 
organisations, etc.) when constructing a population of CSOs.    
27 The definition of civil society used in this map-
ping exercise is the definition offered by the Johns 
Hopkins Center “Estudio comparativo del tercer 
sector”, which defines civil society organisations 
as those displaying a number of common traits (i.e. 
they  are  organisations,  non-governmental,  self-
governing, non-profit distributing and voluntary). 
For the remainder of the study the same definition 
of civil society will be used (Espinoza, 2003).
28  A first possible bias in only using the mapping 
exercise (which was compiled in 2000-2001) is, 
of course, time. Organisations founded after 2001 
are not included in the sample.  Furthermore, not 
only fairly young organisations could be discrimi-
nated against. As ministries’ records on registries 
of  organisations  begin  from  1990,  there  could 
be a bias against organisations founded before 
1990.  However, this could already be countered, 
to some extent, by the fact that listings were also 
obtained from other sources, like umbrella organi-
zations and donors.  A second possible bias in this 
type of directory might be an ideological one. This 
bias can originate from the fact that the official 
listing(s)  from  the  ministries  list  organizations 
that have obtained a legal status. To obtain this 
status, they need to be recognized by the state.  
It does not require a lot of imagination to come 
up with the possibility that the least government-
friendly organisations might not be included in 
this list.  Moreover, various organizations in Hon-
duras have complained of not being able to obtain 
the ‘personeria juridica’ based on subjective gov-
ernment  objections,  or  that  organisations  have 
been  threatened  with  losing  their  legal  status 
if they do not comply with certain prescriptions 
(such as a number of Gay and Lesbian organisa-
tions)  (Amnesty International, 2005). This bias 
will not so easily be countered by the inclusion of 
listings offered by donors and organisations. Do-
nors and CSOs might not be willing to jeopardise 
their relations with the government or their own 
legal status respectively. Apart from the (poten-
tial) ideological bias created by the ‘personeria 
juridica’  listings,  these  listing  also  induce  a  re-
source bias, as it might be costly, both in terms 
of time, human and financial resources, to obtain 
legal status.  Once again, the alternative sources 
of CSOs can remedy this bias to a degree. This 
concise review makes clear that for our research 
purposes two very important biases exist in the 
mapping  exercise,  namely  time  and  ideological 
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Therefore, in our research we have used a triangulation of 
different sources: a review of newspapers;29 the internet; an inquiry in 
the municipality of the largest “city” in the region; and finally, each of 
the respondents from the participating sample was asked to enumer-
ate the CSOs with which they are in contact.30  All of these CSO list-
ings were then combined with the listings from the original mapping 
exercise to constitute our universe of CSOs.  It can be argued that the 
press sample from three different domestic newspapers is an especial-
ly good way to tackle the time bias of the previous population. Further-
more, given that newspapers in Honduras are not without ideological 
tendencies, news coverage may be somewhat one-sided (Leyva, 2002). 
Regardless of the content of the articles though, even the more contro-
versial organisations are mentioned in newspapers, and will thus be in-
corporated into our listing, thereby mitigating the ideological bias.  We 
do realise that this constructed universe of CSOs is hardly equivalent 
to ‘the’ civil society in Honduras or, better yet, to civil society in those 
regions under review. However, we also believe that our methodology 
of constructing the population, compared to similar empirical CSO re-
search, is definitely not less accurate, encompassing or more biased 
than other authors who often choose only one of the above methods. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that the external validity 
of our results is not without reservations, and therefore particular cau-
tion should be given not to extrapolate our results to ‘Honduran civil 
society’ in general. As was done with participating CSOs, a random 
sample was drawn from each of the four regions. A total of 99 organisa-
tions were interviewed. The survey response rate was high (i.e. 75%),31 
thanks to an active approach32 to eliminate non-responses. The dura-
tion of the interviews ranged between half an hour and two hours. The 
way in which the various organisations were approached was uniform 
to the extent possible (e.g. the telephone conversation, the introduc-
tion, the same interviewer for all interviews, etc.). 
29 Three different newspapers (i.e. El Heraldo, La 
Tribuna and La Prensa) were screened to capture 
differences in ideological tendencies as well as dif-
ferences between regions.
30  The  snowball  method  is  a  well-established  
technique to construct a population (Lavalle et 
al., 2005)
  
31 Academic practice differs on whether or not to 
include  untraceable  respondents  in  the  non-re-
sponse rates. Our 75 % response rate is based 
on treating untraceable organisations as non-re-
sponses.  All organisations that we were able to 
trace agreed to participate in the research.  There-
fore, some researchers would present this as a 
100 % response rate.
32  For  participating  organisations,  we  had  the 
names and sometimes the telephone and/or iden-
tity card numbers of the members that participat-
ed.  For the non-participating organisations, we 
often only had the name of the organisation to go 
by and the source where we found their name (e.g. 
a  newspaper,  contact  person,  internet  address, 
etc.). Tracking organisations was not always easy 
(e.g. the lack of address, telephone number, and/
or members names).  Some names on the lists 
of participating organisations were not readable, 
but as the participants also needed to record their 
identity  card  number  thereon,  inquiries  at  the 
register of births sometimes solved the problem.  
Furthermore, inquiries in the local city hall, the lo-
cal ‘pulperia’ or other key organisations helped us 
track down some of the less visible organisations. 
Twenty-five organisations remained untraceable. 
It goes without saying that the face-to-face inter-
view approach dramatically heightened respond-
ents’ willingness to dedicate time to answering 
our  questions.  None  of  the  organisations  that 
were traced and contacted refused to participate 
in the interview. One respondent did agree to the 
interview, but said however that their organisa-
tion had recently ceased to exist.
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   6.1  The dependent variable: intention to participate
The theoretical sample was constructed on the basis of 
participation in the last participatory meetings organised for review-
ing the third PRSP progress report.  However, the problem with meas-
uring participation is that for a number of variables there needs to be 
a time lag to connect them meaningfully. For example, perceptions of 
political efficacy cannot be measured after (actual) political participa-
tion. The same goes for contacts with recruitment actors. In order to 
relate the perceived efficacy of participation or recruitment contacts 
with participation, the former needs to proceed the latter. If not, the 
explanatory factors may well be the result of the political participa-
tion. Our survey was conducted almost a year after the previous par-
ticipation experience. As we cannot examine previous participation, 
we inquired about organisations’ intentions to participate again (or 
not) when a similar meeting would be held.  The phrasing of the ques-
tion was made as precise and concrete as possible and was loaded33 
to limit socially-desirable answering.  Almost forty percent of the or-
ganisations surveyed said that they would not participate in any future 
(similar) meetings to review the PRS Progress Report, sixty percent in-
dicated that they would.34  The intention to participate variable was 
to be cross-checked with the attendance lists of the next participatory 
meetings organised for the fourth Progress Report.  However, govern-
ment changes in 2006 resulted in the PRS being rewritten, and so no 
further Progress Reports will be produced on the previous PRSP.  There 
is, however, the chance that a nationwide, civil society participatory 
process will be held to review the revised PRSP.  It is our intention to 
use data on participation from these fora to cross-check intentions to 
participate with actual participation.
Thus, in our research an attempt is made to explain the in-
tention (or none) to participate in PRS participatory fora. The depend-
ent variable is a dichotomous variable, with zero indicating no inten-
tion to participate and 1 indicating an intention to participate.  Given 
the nature of the dependent variable, a logistic regression model is 
applied. The adapted civic voluntarism model is used to explain par-
ticipation. To check for the multi-collinearity of independent variables, 
correlation analysis was performed.
33The question asked was, ‘Nowadays many meet-
ings are organised for all sorts of purposes.  People 
cannot  always  attend  all  meetings  because  of  any 
number of reasons.  If next week, in Tegucigalpa, a 
meeting would be organised in order to evaluate the 
Fourth Progress Report of the PRSP, would you attend 
this meeting?
34 Although there a significant positive correlation 
between previous participation and the intention 
to participate (gamma = 0.524), it is not as strong 
as we would have expected.  Many of the organi-
sations that did indeed participate indicated that 
they would not participate in the next time. In 
interviews, some said that they wouldn’t go be-
cause they did not find it useful, others because 
they had only participated in the previous meet-
ing by chance.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 • 2 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
   6.2  Testing the model
The model contains eight variables (Table 5). The analysis 
finds that four variables significantly explain CSOs’ intentions to par-
ticipate in PRS participatory meetings. They are: material resources; 
educational level; direct recruitment contacts; and the organization’s 
type.  Since they are categorical variables, each level of the variable 
must be interpreted in relation to the reference category to provide 
meaningful results. 
	 Table	5:	 Binary	Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	the	Adapted	Model
Dimension Variables Adapted Model
B Sig. Exp(B)
Resources Material resources index**   ,039  
material resources index (moderate)** -2,059 ,011 ,128
material resources index (high)* -1,357 ,098 ,257
Availability of staff ,001 ,825 1,001
Education *   ,056  
Education (secundary)** 1,800 ,044 6,052
Education (university) ** 1,888 ,022 6,608
Engagement Perception cso influence on public policy   ,300  
perception cso influence on public policy (moderate) -1,273 ,153 ,280
perception cso influence on public policy (high) -,701 ,471 ,496
Recruitment Contact PRS council (yes)*** 1,773 ,005 5,888
Contact PRS donor frequency -,011 ,912 ,989
Control Year foundation  (after 1982) ,739 ,215 2,095
Organisational level (high) ** 1,228 ,046 3,414
  Constant -,767 ,470 ,465
Nagelkerke R Square = 0.421   Percentage correctly predicted 78.1
* = significant at 0.1 level   ** = significant at 0.05 level   ***= significant at 0.01 level
We find that the odds of a higher-level organization in-
tending to participate are more than three times greater than those of 
a first-level organization intending to participate.  This finding seems 
to corroborate the importance of umbrella organisations in the partici-
pation process, as was suggested by the PRS source book that higher 
level organisations should play an important role as intermediaries 
between national government and local level stakeholders. 
Furthermore, we find that the educational level of an or-
ganization as well as recruitment contacts with the central PRSP coun-
cil are of crucial importance in explaining intention to participate.24 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
The  odds  of  a  secondary-or  university  education  level 
organization intending to participate are six times those of a primary 
educational level organization participating.   Nevertheless, we find 
that the variable ‘educational level’ on the aggregate is only borderline 
significant ( at the 0.056 level). We believe that the relation between 
educational  level  and  participation  should  be  conceptualised  as  a 
treshhold. We find there to be no significant difference between sec-
ondary or universitary education in explaining intention to participate. 
Once a primary level of education is surpassed the educational level is 
not very important in explaining intention to participate.   
Finally, the odds of an organization with central PRSP 
council contact intending to participate are almost six times higher 
than those of an organization with no contacts.  This finding highlights 
the importance of networks for recruiting CSOs into participation, es-
pecially contacts with the PRS council.  Remarkably the data shows no 
recruitment by the ‘ PRS ‘ donors. 
The relationship between resources and intention to par-
ticipate is somewhat suprising. The odds of an organization with medi-
um resource availability intending to participate are lower than those 
of an organization with few resources available. Moreover, a bivariate 
analysis of the relation between material resources and intention to 
participate indicates that there is no clear relation between resources 
and participation.
As was clear from the logistic regression, the perception 
of civil society’s influence on public policy does not seem to have a 
significant influence on the intention to participate, which is, in itself, 
quite a remarkable finding.
   6.3  Comparison with previous findings
Summarizing the analytical results of the adapted model, 
we find that high-level organizations, organizations with high-levels 
of education and those that maintain contacts with the PRS council 
are more likely to intend to participate than other organizations.  Basi-
cally, in explaining the intention to participate the type of organization, 
its educational level and its relational ties with other groups matter. 
Furthermore, we find an ambiguous inverse relationship between ma-
terial resources and the intention to participate, although this finding 
should be interpreted with caution. We can state, therefore, that more 
resources do not increase the odds of an organization participating. 
These findings concur with one of the rare studies on the same subject, 
albeit at the local level (i.e. Lavalle, Acharya and Houtzager’s research 
into CSO participation in Sao Paolo’s participatory councils). When 
juxtaposing the findings of their research with ours, remarkable paral-
lels appear. Both studies find that neither the age of the organization, IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 • 2 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
the type of issues it is involved in significantly explain participation (or, 
as is the case in the adapted model, “the intention to participate”). On 
the other hand, both models find the type of organization, as well as 
relational ties to be important factors in explaining participation. Nev-
ertheless, whereas institutional embeddedness35 (especially contacts 
with political parties) was the variable explaining participation in Sao 
Paolo, in Honduras direct recruitment contacts with the PRS council 
were crucial. Overall, the parallel findings of both analyses, though 
significant differences do exist, seem to suggest some consistency of 
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Further research on this topic is needed to clarify how ex-
actly the relational ties and financial resources of these organisations 
matter for their political participation.
35 In our research, we have checked for institution-
al embeddedness, as well as the nature of issues 
in which the organisations are involved. Neither 
variable significantly contributed to explaining 2 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-04 Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Processes
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